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Abstract
In the framework of a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly, with un-
covered market and costless quality choice, we study the existence of
a price equilibrium when a welfare-maximizing public firm producing
low quality goods competes against a profit-maximizing private firm
producing high quality goods. We show that a price equilibrium exists
if the quality spectrum is wide enough vis a` vis a measure of the con-
vexity of the distribution of the consumers’ willingness to pay, and that
such equilibrium is unique if this sufficient condition is tightened. Log-
concavity of the income distribution is inconsistent with the existence
of equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Mixed oligopolies can be observed in many countries and industries. In
mixed industries (e.g. public utilities, transportation, telecommunication,
energy, postal services, education, health care, etc.) public firms compete
with private firms in price, quantity and the quality of goods. It is frequently
argued that public firms supply goods or services, the quality of which is
lower than that provided by private firms: e.g., such is allegedly the case
in many countries for education and health care, or in transportation and
postal services (Ishibashi & Kaneko 2008). A number of papers address the
question of why this should be so, in the framework of a welfare-maximizing
public firm competing with a profit-maximizing private one.1 However, the
answer they provide is usually sought by assuming away any role for the
distribution of the willingness to pay across consumers, either because the
crucial feature of uncovered market is ruled out, or because – while allowing
for uncovered markets – the standard, uniform-distribution model of vertical
differentiation is used.2 This is somewhat surprising on at least two counts:
at a very general level, most informal arguments justifying the very existence
of public firms competing with private firms rely on distributional concerns
1For the standard theory of mixed oligopoly see, e.g., Harris & Wiens (1980), De Fraja
& Delbono (1989), Grilo (1994), Barros & Martinez-Giralt (2002), Cantos-S. & Moner-
Colonques (2006), Maldonado & Cremer (2013). For alternative theories of mixed
oligopoly with non-welfare-maximizing behavior, see Fershtman (1990), Cremer et al.
(1991), Barros (1995) and Estrin & De Meza (1995). In particular, to analyze mixed
oligopoly equilibria when the firms’ objectives are endogenous, De Donder & Roemer
(2009) study a vertically differentiated mixed market where one firm is profit-maximizing
while the other maximizes revenues, but one firm becomes welfare-maximizing when the
government takes a participation in it.
2Thus, e.g., Ishibashi & Kaneko (2008) use the Hotelling model to argue that in a
duopoly equilibrium the public firm would supply the lower quality, and the private firm
the higher (in fact, higher than efficient) quality level. On the other hand, Delbono et al.
(1996) use the standard uncovered market model to show that an equilibrium where the
public (private) firm chooses the low (high) quality exists, though an equilibrium with
inverted quality allocations also exists, and market segmentation is exogenous (also, this
is a framework where it is problematic to find analytical solutions). For an overview of
this issue, see Fraja & Delbono (1990)
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about inequality and providing the poor with access to goods and services;
and, more to the point at the analytical level, it is in general well known that
the distribution of the willingness to pay affects the firms’ equilibrium choices
and can in principle affect the very existence of equilibria (Grandmont 1993,
Anderson et al. 1997).
In this paper we focus on the existence of a price equilibrium in a verti-
cally differentiated mixed duopoly with uncovered market, to confirm that
the distribution of the willingness to pay affects equilibria. We assume cost-
less quality choice, which allows us to concentrate upon the relevant features
of demand and hence the distribution of the willingness to pay, and we model
a mixed duopoly as a case where a welfare-maximizing, low-quality produc-
ing public firm competes against a profit-maximizing, high-quality produc-
ing private firm. In this framework we show that for a price equilibrium to
exist the distribution of the willingness to pay cannot be logconcave, and
that sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness place a lower bound
on the (given) quality spectrum – a lower bound which is higher, the higher
the given convexity bound on the income distribution.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the
general framework of mixed duopoly with vertical differentiation; Section 3
gives the solution for a market price equilibrium and discusses existence and
uniqueness; Section 4 presents an example where the consumers’ willingness
to pay is supposed to be distributed as a Pareto distribution, while some
concluding remarks are gathered in Section 5.
2 The model
We start from a standard model of duopoly competition with vertical dif-
ferentiation, uncovered market and costless quality choice, as developed by
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Mussa & Rosen (1978), Shaked & Sutton (1982) and (Tirole 1988, chap.
7.5). There are two competing firms, i = H,L, playing a non-cooperative
game on price. Each firm i produces a good of quality si ∈ {sH , sL}, where
0 < sL < sH <∞ and ∆ = sH −sL > 0 denotes the quality differential. We
crucially assume that L is a a welfare-maximizing public firm producing low
quality goods, while H is a profit-maximizing private firm producing high
quality goods; production costs are normalized to zero.3 The firms’ profits
are Πi = piDi, where pi and Di, i = H,L, denote prices and demands:
higher quality sH sells at a price pH , and lower quality sL at a price pL.
Each consumer is identified by her marginal willingness to pay for quality,
θ, and has a utility Ui(θ) = θsi − pi if she buys a unit of good from firm i,
and 0 otherwise. The marginal consumer, who is indifferent between buying
the high and the low quality, has utility UH(θ) = UL(θ), and is accordingly
identified by θH = (pH − pL) /∆; the marginal consumer who is indifferent
between purchasing the low quality commodity and nothing at all has utility
UL(θ) = 0, and is identified by θL = pL/sL.
4 Clearly, θL and θH denote the
positions of these marginal consumers along the ‘income’ scale: for later
reference, it is useful to derive the price elasticities of θL and θH , which are
given by εH =
∂θH
∂pH
pH
θH
= pHpH−pL > 1 and εL =
∂θH
∂pL
pL
θH
= −pLpH−pL < 0, such
that εH + εL = 1.
Normalizing the consumers’ population to 1 and assuming that the will-
ingness to pay θ is continuously distributed over some nonnegative support
Θ ⊆ R+, we define the density function f (θ) such that the implied cumula-
3This is clearly equivalent to costs being fixed and independent of quality. Although
obviously questionable on a number of grounds, such an assumption allows to focus on
the firms’ strategic choices as driven by demand, and hence to bring out the role of the
distribution of the consumers’ willingness to pay, e.g., Tirole (1988, p. 147) and Wauthy
(1996).
4These are the basic features of the standard vertical differentiation model (Mussa &
Rosen 1978) ; as is well known, the marginal willingness to pay θ can be looked at as a
proxy for income (Gabszewicz & Thisse 1979).
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tive distribution is F : Θ → [0, 1]. Using primes to denote derivatives, it is
convenient for our purposes to define also the following elasticities:
η (θ) =
θf (θ)
1− F (θ) , (1)
pi (θ) = lim
h→0
d log
(
1
µ
∫ θ+h
y xf(x)dx
)
d log θ
= 1 +
θf ′(θ)
f(θ)
, (2)
where definition (1) is the (positive) elasticity of 1−F (θ) and definition (2)
is the Esteban elasticity of the density f (θ).5 We use these definitions to
gather our basic assumptions on F in the following assumption.
Assumption 1 The distribution F is such that:
(a) the lower bound of the support Θ (θmin say) obeys θmin = 0 = η (θmin),
and the upper bound (θmax say) is such that limθ→θmax η (θ) > 1;
(b) there exists some α ∈ (0, 1] such that, ∀α˜ ∈ [α, 1], (1 + α˜) η (θ) + pi (θ)−
1 > 0, ∀ θ ∈ Θ;
(c) let θ˜ be the smallest value such that η (·) = 1: then there exists a (unique)
value θ◦, 0 < θ◦ ≤ θ˜ such that pi (θ◦) = 0, and such that pi (θ◦) > 0 for θ < θ◦
and pi (θ◦) < 0 for θ > θ◦.
Assumption 1(a) implies that at equilibrium the market cannot be com-
pletely covered, and that the value of θ at which η (θ) = 1 (which is pivotal in
what follows) lies strictly within Θ. Assumption 1(b) implies that (1−F )−α
is a convex function, which in turn limits in some way the convexity of the
5Esteban (1986) defines the function pi (·) as per our definition (2) and shows that it
stands in a one-to-one relationship with the underlying density f (·): accordingly, it gives
an alternative representation of the density itself, which in some circumstances may be
useful, especially so as some regularity features are apparently supported by empirical
evidence. See (Benassi & Chirco 2006) for the relationship between the Esteban elasticity
and stochastic dominance, and Majumder & Chakravarty (1990) for some related empirical
evidence.
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relationship between the size of the covered market, 1− F (·), and the con-
sumers’ willingness to pay θ.6 It should be stressed that by excluding the
extreme value α = 0 we are ruling out log-concavity, while α being finite
rules out the uniform distribution, which one would get as α → −∞, e.g.,
Caplin & Nalebuff (1991, p. 3). The same assumption also implies that:
η (θ) + pi (θ) > 1− αη (θ) , (3)
which in turn means that η is monotonically increasing for η (θ) ≤ 1, i.e.
over
[
0, θ˜
]
. Also, this places a restriction on the function pi (·) to the effect
that, for η (θ) ≤ 1, i.e. over
[
0, θ˜
]
,
pi (θ) > −α ≥ −1. (4)
All this should clarify Assumption 1(c), which rules that the function
pi (surely positive by condition (3) as θ nears zero) changes sign only once
within
[
0, θ˜
]
.7
Since we look for the Nash equilibrium of the game, we first have to
determine the demand functions faced by firms L and H: DH = 1−F (θH),
DL = F (θH) − F (θL), where F (θj) represents the fraction of consumers
with a taste parameter less than θj , j = L,H. The corresponding profit
functions are given by ΠH = pHDH , ΠL = pLDL. Finally, we define the
social welfare function as the sum of the firms’ and the consumers’ surplus:
W = sH
∫∞
θH
θf (θ) dθ+sL
∫ θH
θL
θf (θ) dθ, and crucially assume that the public
6Indeed, it is easily seen that d
2
dθ2
(1−F )−α = α
θ
f(θ)
(1−F (θ))α+1 [(1 + α) η (θ) + pi (θ)− 1] >
0. Following Caplin & Nalebuff (1991), we can say that function (1−F ) is ρ-concave (with
ρ = −α < 0), which is equivalent to saying that − (1− F )α is concave. Moreover, a ρ-
concave function is also ρ˜-concave for all ρ˜ < ρ, which means that what is true for a given
α ∈ (0, 1] is also true for every α˜ > α included in the same interval.
7This is the case with many widely used distributions, such as Gamma and Pareto
distributions.
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firm sets the price of low quality goods pL to maximize the social welfare
function W .
3 Price equilibrium
In this Section, we take up Nash equilibria in prices: we first study existence,
and then enquire about uniqueness.8
3.1 Existence of the price equilibrium
Given the price pL set by the public firm on the ‘low-quality’ goods, pH is
charged by firm H maximizing its profit ΠH . The corresponding first order
conditions (FOCs) in terms of elasticity are given by:
η (θH) εH = 1, (5)
which implies η (θH) < 1. The second order conditions (SOCs) can be
similarly characterized in elasticity terms as:
2η (θH) + pi (θH) > 0, (6)
which implies, given that η (θH) < 1 by condition (5), the necessary condi-
tion pi (θH) > −1, consistently with (4).9
To set the price pL, the public firm maximizes the social welfare W . The
8Given a quality pair (sH , sL), existence and uniqueness can clearly be established with
reference to a (or the) pair of marginal consumers along the ‘income’ scale, (θ∗H , θ
∗
L), as
it will be p∗H = θ
∗
H (sH − sL) + θ∗LsL, and pL = θ∗LsL.
9The FOCs and SOCs for firm H can be written out as: ∂ΠH
∂pH
= 1−F (θH)− pH∆ f (θH) =
0; ∂
2ΠH
∂p2
H
= −2f (θH) − pH∆ f ′ (θH) < 0, from which (5) and (6) can easily be derived by
using definitions (1) and (2).
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corresponding FOCs are:
η (θH)
η (θL)
=
1− F (θL)
1− F (θH) > 1, (7)
from which θH > θL implies η (θH) > η (θL). The SOCs are given by:
(1− η (θH))pi (θH) + η (θH)pi (θL) > 0, (8)
which again are set in elasticity terms.10
As a result, at a price equilibrium for given sH and sL, pH and pL are
identified by the twin FOCs (5) and (7), such that the twin SOCs (6) and
(8) hold.
Before enquiring about existence of equilibrium, it is worth stressing that
– irrespective of our assumptions on the distribution of the willingness to
pay and indeed justifying them – the basic framework we are using (though
indeed quite standard) is inconsistent with a logconcave distribution of the
consumers’ willingness to pay – including the limit case of the uniform distri-
bution. Intuitively, this is so because of the way a marginal change in prices
affects the positions of the marginal consumers. An increase in pL pushes the
marginal consumers nearer each other, by shifting linearly one to the right
(θL) and the other to the left (θH) – that is, the set of middle-class consumers
patronizing low-quality gets smaller, and that of the high-income consumers
patronizing high quality gets larger. Since this has opposite effects on overall
welfare, the latter is maximized when the marginal contribution to welfare
of enlarging the set of high-quality consumers is equal to the marginal cost
10The FOCs and SOCs for the public firm are respectively ∂W
∂pL
= θHf (θH)−θLf (θL) =
0, and ∂
2W
∂p2
L
= − f(θH )
∆
pi (θH) − f(θL)sL pi (θL) < 0. In equilibrium, the latter is equivalent
to condition (8), as can be seen by multiplying through by pL > 0, substituting for
εL = 1− εH , and taking advantage of the FOCs (5) and (7).
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of pricing out the poor. This, however, (a) requires that the income density
falls sharply enough as we move from θL to θH , and (b) has to be consis-
tent with the high-quality firm maximizing its profits. The latter obviously
calls for the price elasticity of demand for high-quality be one: given the
structure of preferences (such that a small increase in pH has a big effect
on the location of the high-quality marginal consumer: εH > 1), this in
turn dictates that η (θH) < 1 as from (5). Logconcavity, by constraining the
relationship between η (·) and pi (·) as defined in (1) and (2), is inconsistent
with both requirements holding at once: if the distribution is logconcave,
high-quality demand being sufficiently rigid is inconsistent with the density
falling rapidly enough around θH , which under logconcavity would mean
high demand elasticity from the marginal high-quality consumer.11
We can now state the following proposition on the existence of a price
equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Let (sH , sL) be a given pair of qualities, such that 0 < sL <
sH <∞, and let k = sL/∆ such that η (θ◦) < 11+k . Then under Assumption
1 a price equilibrium exists.
Proof. See Appendix 6A
Proposition (1) establishes that a price equilibrium exists, if some con-
straints are satisfied concerning the distribution of the willingness to pay vis
a` vis the quality spectrum being offered. First notice that welfare maximiza-
tion by firm L leads to θH lying on a downward portion of the density f (θ).
11Log-concavity amounts to the constraint pi (θ) > 1−η (θ) for all θ, such that η (θH) < 1
is inconsistent with pi (θH) < 0. On the other hand, pi (θH) has to be negative, if welfare
has to be maximized. This condition, which dictates that the density should be sufficiently
(and negatively) steep around θH , can be seen by observing that θf (θ) is the marginal
contribution to social welfare of the consumers whose willingness to pay is θ, and that its
derivative is f (θ)pi (θ): the former cannot be increasing around θH if FOCs (7) are to be
satisfied, i.e. if θHf (θH) = θLf (θL) (see also footnote 10).
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Indeed, the FOCs (7) boil down to θLf (θL) = θHf (θH): analytically, this is
inconsistent with both marginal consumers being on an upward sloping por-
tion of the density itself, while economically it amounts to the marginal gain
in welfare due to a marginal increase in pL being nil. In other words, welfare
maximization leads to an ‘aggressive’ behaviour by the low quality (public)
firm which expands output, driving the ‘high-quality’ indifferent consumer
(identified by θH) towards the right tail of the distribution.
12 This in turn
accounts for our Assumption 1(a) ruling out complete market coverage, as
this would imply θHf (θH) = 0, which is inconsistent with firm H maxi-
mizing its profits.13 It also accounts for Assumption 1(b), which rules out
log-concavity: as already remarked, log-concave distributions (as well as the
uniform distribution) are inconsistent with a price equilibrium of this game.
Secondly, the condition η (θ◦) < 11+k , together with Assumption 1(b),
implies k < α, i.e.
sH
sL
> 1 +
1
α
, (9)
which again is consistent with ruling out log-concavity (α = 0), and links
the width of the admissible quality spectrum to the degree of convexity of
the distribution of the consumers’ willingness to pay. In fact, the lower
α, the higher the lower bound on the (given) quality differential consistent
with the existence of a price equilibrium, while the upper limit case where
α = 1 yields the constraint sH > 2sL.
14 Intuitively, this happens because
ceteris paribus the width of the quality spectrum affects the concavity of
the firm’s payoff: if the two products are close substitutes, the demand for
12Notice that, in the ‘ordinary’ case of both firms being profit-maximizers, both marginal
consumers will be on the left of the mode when the density is symmetric and unimodal.
See, e.g., Benassi et al. (2006).
13Given pL = 0, firm H would set a price pH such that η (pH/∆) = 1 so that θHf (θH) >
0.
14In this case [1− F (θ)]−1 would be a convex function. Notice that if 1 − F (θ) is
log-concave, [1− F (θ)]−1 is convex, but not viceversa.
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(say) firm L’s product will be very elastic, and indeed too much for firm’s L
payoff (welfare) function to be well behaved.15 A minimum quality spread
ensures that vertical product differentiation survives in equilibrium, and
that welfare is not maximized by setting the price equal to the marginal
cost: the welfare gain associated to complete market coverage is less than
the welfare loss associated with lower profits for both the high and the low
quality firms.16
Finally, from the existence proof reported in Appendix 6A, it turns out
that a necessary condition for existence is that θ∗L < θ
◦ < θ∗H : i.e., along the
distribution of the willingness to pay, θ◦ is a sort of pivotal point around
which the positions of the marginal consumers arrange themselves. This in
turn implies that at equilibrium one necessarily has:
η (θH)− η (θL) > 1
sH
sL
(
sH
sL
− 1
) , (10)
which means that the minimum (elasticity) distance between the two marginal
consumers (and hence the market for the low quality commodity) is higher,
the lower the quality ratio.17 In some sense there is a trade-off between
how steeply demand rises with the willingness to pay going from θL to θH ,
and the quality differential: if the latter is low, equilibrium with vertical
differentiation requires that ‘middle-class’ consumers are very willing to pay
15Take, e.g., the SOCs for firm L in footnote (10): since pi (θH) will be negative at
equilibrium, this expression cannot be negative if ∆ is too small, and more generally, if
products were too close welfare would be a convex function of pL.
16Under this respect, Assumption 1(b) plays a key role, as it amounts ceteris paribus to
a lower boundary on η (·): if the covered market is sufficiently elastic with respect to the
consumers’ willingness to pay, the marginal gain in welfare from a price reduction will be
low.
17Under our assumptions η (θ) is monotonically increasing in the relevant interval: equa-
tion (10) then follows by noting that in equilibrium it must be η (θL) < 1/(1 + k) and
substituting for the definition of k. The income level θ◦ is such that pi (θ◦) = 0, i.e. the
elasticity of the density equals −1.
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for even a modest quality premium.18
While Assumption 1 and the condition η (θ◦) < 11+k set out in Propo-
sition 1 are sufficient to ensure the existence of a price equilibrium, one is
naturally interested in looking at the circumstances under which such an
equilibrium is unique. Indeed, since we have to rule out log-concavity, we
cannot use the well-known result by Caplin & Nalebuff (1991) to the effect
that log-concavity implies uniqueness. This is the issue we take up next.
3.2 Uniqueness of the price equilibrium
Our main result on uniqueness is the following:
Proposition 2 Let the assumptions of Proposition 1 hold, and assume fur-
ther that:
(a) k ≤ α2
1−α2 , and
(b) α ≤ 1/2,
then the price equilibrium is unique.
Proof. See Appendix 7B
Both sufficient conditions can be read as strengthening the looser condi-
tions which ensure existence. Indeed, it is easily seen that condition (a) in
Proposition 2 amounts to:
sH
sL
≥ 1
α2
, (11)
and that, comparing this with constraint (9), 1/α2 > 1 + 1/α for α ≤ 1/2,
i.e. condition (b) in Proposition 2. In this sense uniqueness is delivered
when the lower bound on the quality differential is higher than that which
18Notice that, in the case where the public firm’s objective was justified in terms of the
median voter theorem, if the income distribution is asymmetric and unimodal, the policy
makers may look at the marginal willingness to pay of the median consumer, instead of
that of the average consumer (as required by social welfare maximization).
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is sufficient to ensure existence, so that (broadly speaking) for the price
equilibrium to be unique, the quality levels should be sufficiently far apart,
by an amount which is determined by the concavity of the distribution.
4 An example: the Pareto distribution
In this Section we apply our model to the case of a Pareto distribution. While
clearly limited to a specific case, we believe that this example can serve as
an illustration of the way the distribution of the willingness to pay affects
equilibrium outcomes. Suppose then that the consumers’ willingness to pay
is distributed as a Pareto distribution of the second kind (Johnson et al.
1995), so that the density and the cumulative distributions are respectively
f(θ, γ) = γ (1 + θ)−(1+γ) and F (θ, γ) = 1− 1
(1+θ)γ
, defined over the support
Θ = [0,∞), where γ > 1 is a given parameter. It is then easily seen that
pi(θ, γ) = 1−γθ1+θ and η(θ, γ) =
γθ
1+θ such that Assumption 1 is satisfied. In
particular, Assumption 1(b) holds for any α = 1/γ, so that 1 − F (θ) is
ρ-concave with ρ = −1/γ; notice also that in this case we have θ˜ = 1γ−1 >
θ◦ = 1γ such that η(θ˜) = 1 and pi (θ
◦) = 0. In addition, η (θ◦) = γ/ (1 + γ),
such that the condition η (θ◦) < 1/ (1 + k) set out in Proposition 1 reduces
to k < 1/γ. It should be remarked that in this framework γ is an inverse
parameter of first order stochastic dominance, so that higher values of γ
support lower mean values of the consumers’ willingness to pay.19
We now perform a numerical simulation with different values of γ, say
between γ = 2 and γ = 3, to see the way a shift on the distribution of the
willingness to pay affects the equilibrium prices. To do so we set k = 1/8 <
1/γ, which is equivalent to sH/sL = 9. According to Proposition 2 (and
condition (11)), this quality ratio delivers a unique equilibrium for α ≥ 1/3,
19Mean willingness to pay is µ = 1/(γ − 1).
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which is verified as α = 1/γ ≥ 1/3, while α ≤ 1/2 as required by sufficient
condition (b) of the same Proposition. Within this framework, we perform
three simulations for γ = 2, γ = 5/2 and γ = 3. Table 1 reports equilibrium
values of the positions of the marginal consumers, θ∗H and θ
∗
L, obtained for
these different values of γ.
γ = 2 γ = 5/2 γ = 3
θ∗H 0.93629 0.61392 0.45498
θ∗L 0.25484 0.25318 0.24011
Table 1: Equilibrium marginal values of willingness to pay
From Table 1, we see that in the case of a Pareto distribution, an increase
in γ (i.e. lower mean income) leads to a leftward shift of both marginal con-
sumers, together with a decrease in the distance between them. This would
point to decreasing income leading to stiffer competition, which is confirmed
by Table 2 below, such that relative prices decrease unambiguously with
higher values of γ.
γ = 2 γ = 5/2 γ = 3
p∗H
p∗L
30.392 20.399 16.159
Table 2: Equilibrium relative prices
In Table 3 we report the behaviour of hedonic prices.
γ = 2 γ = 5/2 γ = 3
p∗H
s∗H
0.86057 0.57384 0.43111
p∗L
s∗L
0.25484 0.25318 0.24011
Table 3: Equilibrium hedonic prices
Table 3 suggests that lower average income – at least in this example –
puts a downward pressure on the price per ‘unit of quality’, which appears to
14
be stronger for the (profit-maximizing) high quality firm. Both relationships
(Tables 2 and 3) are apparently monotone, suggesting that the competition
of the public sector (or of the regulated industry) will be more intense in
case of lower average income (i.e., the larger the parameter γ).
5 Conclusions
Starting by informal arguments that public firms competing with private
firms rely on distributional concerns about inequality, and by formal reason-
ing that the distribution of the willingness to pay affects the firms’ equilib-
rium choices, in this paper we show that a price equilibrium in a vertically
differentiated mixed duopoly with uncovered market exists, if the quality
spectrum is wide enough vis a` vis a measure of the convexity of the dis-
tribution of the consumers’ willingness to pay, and that such equilibrium
is unique if this sufficient condition is tightened. In particular, we show
that for a price equilibrium to exist the distribution of the willingness to
pay cannot be logconcave, and that sufficient conditions for existence and
uniqueness place on the quality spectrum a lower bound, which is higher,
the higher the given convexity bound on the income distribution.
By way of example, we apply our model to a Pareto distribution, and
find that a decrease of average income is (broadly speaking) associated with
higher competitive pressure from the public firm, as signaled, e.g., by a
decrease of the distance between the marginal willingness to pay for high vs
low quality goods, and of relative prices – the price of high quality decreases
relative to that of low quality; also, the decrease in hedonic prices appears
to be stronger for the high quality goods. Though obviously constrained
by the specific form of this example, these results confirm that assumptions
about the distribution of the consumers’ willingness to pay do play a key
15
role in assessing the working of vertically differentiated markets.
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6 Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
First notice that Assumption 1(c) implies:
1
1 + α
< η (θ◦) <
1
1 + k
< 1,
so that k < α ≤ 1. Let now θ˜ > θ◦ be defined by the condition η (θ¯) = 11+k ,
and θ˜ > θ¯ be defined by η
(
θ˜
)
= 1: since by Assumption 1(b) η (·) is
monotonically increasing over
[
0, θ˜
]
, both are uniquely identified. Let now
A =
[
θ¯, θ˜
]
, and define the function σ : A→ R+ such that:
σ (θH) =
θH
k
(
1
η (θH)
− 1
)
,
which associates to any given θH the values of θL = σ which are consistent
with profit maximization by firm H, as from (5), since εH = 1 +
θL
θH
1
k . Now
observe that, since θ◦ < θ¯, one has pi
(
θ¯
)
< 0, and pi (σ (θH)) < 0 for θH ∈ A;
also, σ′ (θH) < 0, so that σ
(
θ¯
)
= θ¯ > σ
(
θ˜
)
= 0. Indeed:
σ′ (θH) = −2ηH + pi (θH)− 1
kη (θH)
< 0,
by Assumption 1(b). Let now define the function λ : A→ R, such that:
λ (θH) = η (θH) [1− F (θH)]− [1− F (σ (θH))] η (σ (θH)) ,
and notice that λ
(
θ¯
)
= 0, λ
(
θ˜
)
= 1−F
(
θ˜
)
> 0, while λ′
(
θ¯
)
= f
(
θ¯
)
pi
(
θ¯
) [
1− σ′ (θ¯)] <
0, as σ′
(
θ¯
)
< 0 and pi
(
θ¯
)
< 0. Then, by continuity, there exists a value θ∗H
such that λ (θ∗H) = 0 < λ
′ (θ∗H).
We claim that the pair (θ∗H , θ
∗
L) = (θ
∗
H , σ (θ
∗
H)) identifies an equilibrium.
Indeed, by condition (7), at λ (θ∗H) = 0 the FOCs of the public firm L are
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satisfied, while σ (θ∗H) = θ
∗
L is such that ηH (θ
∗
H) εH = 1, so that both FOCs
(5) and (7) are satisfied. Note that, as σ is decreasing, σ (θ∗H) = θ
∗
L < σ
(
θ¯
)
=
θ¯, which means that piH (θ
∗
H) < 0 (as θ
∗
H > θ¯ > θ
◦), while pi (θ∗L) will be
positive if θ∗L < θ
◦. Notice also that η (θ∗L) = η (σ (θ
∗
H)) < η
(
θ¯
)
= 1/(1 + k),
so that λ (θ∗H) = 0 implies θ
∗
L < θ
◦ < θ∗H . As to SOCs, firm H’s are
satisfied as by Assumption 1(b) 2η (θ∗H) + pi (θ
∗
H) − 1 > (1 + α) η (θ∗H) +
pi (θ∗H)− 1 > 0. As to firm L, recall from condition (8) that one should have
(1− η (θ∗H))pi (θ∗H) + η (θ∗H)pi (θ∗L) > 0. To see this is so, observe that at our
(candidate) equilibrium λ (θ∗H) = 0 < λ
′ (θ∗H). In particular, we have:
λ′ (θ∗H) = f (θH)
[
pi (θH) + pi (σ)
f (θL)
f (θH)
2η (θH) + pi (θH)− 1
kη (θH)
]
> 0,
where we substitute for:
σ′ (θ∗H) = −
2η (θ∗H) + pi (θ
∗
H)− 1
kη
(
θ∗H
) < 0.
As a result,
pi (θ∗H) + pi (θ
∗
L)
f (θ∗L)
f
(
θ∗H
) 2η (θ∗H) + pi (θ∗H)− 1
kη
(
θ∗H
) > 0,
which, since λ = 0 implies f (θ∗L) θ
∗
L = f (θ
∗
H) θ
∗
H , gives:
kη (θ∗H)pi (θ
∗
H) +
θ∗H
θ∗L
[2η (θ∗H) + pi (θ
∗
H)− 1]pi (θ∗L) > 0,
where we recall that pi (θ∗H) < 0. From the definition of σ = θL we have
kη (θ∗H) =
θ∗H
θ∗L
[1− η (θ∗H)]. So if λ′ > 0 = λ we have:
θ∗H
θ∗L
{[1− η (θ∗H)]pi (θ∗H) + [2η (θ∗H) + pi (θ∗H)− 1]pi (θ∗L)} > 0,
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that is, {[1− η (θ∗H)]pi (θ∗H) + [2η (θ∗H) + pi (θ∗H)− 1]pi (θ∗L)} > 0, which im-
plies pi (θ∗L) > 0 as pi (θ
∗
H) < 0. On the other hand, 0 < 2η (θ
∗
H)+pi (θ
∗
H)−1 <
2η (θ∗H)− 1, hence η (θ∗H) > 12 . Since pi (θ∗L) > 0 we can write:
0 < [1− η (θ∗H)]pi (θ∗H) + [2η (θ∗H) + pi (θ∗H)− 1]pi (θ∗L) <
[1− η (θ∗H)]pi (θ∗H) + [2η (θ∗H)− 1]pi (θ∗L) ,
where the last term is smaller than [1− η (θ∗H)]pi (θ∗H)+η (θ∗H)pi (θ∗L). So this
is positive and λ′ (θ∗H) > 0, implies that the SOCs for firm L are verified.
7 Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2
We show that if k ≤ α2
1−α2 and α ≤ 1/2, λ (θ∗H) = 0 implies λ′ (θ∗H) > 0: this
proves uniqueness. To do so we proceed into two steps.
7.1 Step 1
We show that if λ (θ∗H) = 0 < λ
′ (θ∗H), then η (θ
∗
L) < 1 − α, where θ∗L =
σ (θ∗H). Note that by Proposition 1 there certanly exists one such θ
∗
H , and
moreover there certanly exists one θmH < θ
∗
H such that λ
′ (θmH ) = 0 > λ (θ
m
H ).
By the definition of λ′ (·), θmH satisfies:
pi (θmH ) + pi (θ
m
L )
f (θmL )
f
(
θmH
) 2η (θmH ) + pi (θmH )− 1
kη
(
θmH
) = 0,
where θmL = σ (θ
m
H ). Since, by the definition of σ (·), kη (θmH ) = θ
m
H
θmL
[1− η (θmH )],
we have:
pi (θmH ) + pi (θ
m
L )
θmL f (θL)
θmHf
(
θmH
) 2η (θmH ) + pi (θmH )− 1
1− η (θmH) = 0, (B.1)
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where
θmL f(θL)
θmH f(θ
m
H )
=
η(θmL )[1−F(θmL )]
η(θmH )[1−F(θmH )]
> 1 as λ (θmH ) < 1, and hence x (θ
m
H ) =
θmL f(θL)
θmH f(θ
m
H )
2η(θmH )+pi(θ
m
H )−1
1−η(θmH )
> 1, since
2η(θmH )+pi(θ
m
H )−1
1−η(θmH )
> 1. That the latter is
true can be seen by observing that:
2η (θmH ) + pi (θ
m
H )− 1
1− η (θmH) > (1− α) η (θ
m
H )
1− η (θmH) ,
due to Assumption 1(b), and that η (θ∗H) > 1/(1+k), so that (1− α) η (θ∗H) >
(1− α) / (1 + k), while 1− η (θ∗H) < k/(1 + k). Hence,
2η (θH) + pi (θH)− 1
1− η (θH) >
1− α
k
> 1,
where the last inequality stems from α ≤ 1/2 and k < α implying α+k < 1,
i.e. 1− α > k. Since x (θmH ) > 1 and as pi (θmH ) > −α, we have:
pi (θmL ) = −
pi (θmH )
x
(
θmH
) < α
x
(
θmH
) < α. (B.2)
From equation (B.1) we have:
η (θmL )pi (θ
m
L ) = −pi (θmH ) η (θmH )
1− F (θmH )
1− F (θmL ) 1− η (θ
m
H )
2η
(
θmH
)
+ pi
(
θmH
)− 1 ,
where
1−F(θmH )
1−F(θmL )
< 1. From (B.2):
η (θmL )pi (θ
m
L ) <
αη (θmH ) (1− η (θmL ))
2η
(
θmH
)
+ pi
(
θmH
)− 1 ,
where the last inequality comes from η (θmH ) > η (θ
m
L ). Hence:
η (θmL )
[
pi (θmL ) +
αη (θmH )
2η
(
θmH
)
+ pi
(
θmH
)− 1
]
<
αη (θmH )
2η
(
θmH
)
+ pi
(
θmH
)− 1.
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Since pi (θmL ) < α,
η (θmL )
[
pi (θmL ) +
αη (θmH )
2η
(
θmH
)
+ pi
(
θmH
)− 1
]
< αη (θmL )
3η (θmH ) + pi (θ
m
H )− 1
2η
(
θmH
)
+ pi
(
θmH
)− 1 ,
while 2η (θmH ) + pi (θ
m
H )− 1 < 2η (θmH ), as pi (θmH )− 1 < 0, so that:
αη (θmH )
2η
(
θmH
)
+ pi
(
θmH
)− 1 > αη (θmH )2η (θmH) = α2 .
There follows that:
η (θmL )
3η (θmH ) + pi (θ
m
H )− 1
2η
(
θmH
)
+ pi
(
θmH
)− 1 < 12 ,
i.e.:
η (θmL ) <
1
2
2η (θmH ) + pi (θ
m
H )− 1
3η
(
θmH
)
+ pi
(
θmH
)− 1.
So η (θmL ) + α < 1 will hold true if:
η (θmL ) + α <
1
2
2η (θmH ) + pi (θ
m
H )− 1
3η
(
θmH
)
+ pi
(
θmH
)− 1 + α < 1,
that is:
η (θmH )
3η
(
θmH
)
+ pi
(
θmH
)− 1 > 2α− 1,
which is certainly true for α ≤ 12 , as the LHS is surely positive: hence
η (θmL ) < 1−α. Since at θ∗H > θmH and σ′ (·) < 0, θ∗L = σ (θ∗H) < σ (θmH ) = θmL ,
and since η (·) is monotonically increasing η (θ∗L) < η (θmL ) < 1− α.
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7.2 Step 2
We show that equilibrium is unique. Since η (θ∗L) < 1 − α, we can use
Assumption 1(b) to get:
pi (θ∗L) > 1− (1 + α) η (θ∗L) > 1− (1 + α) (1− α) = α2.
Equilibrium is unique if λ = 0 implies λ′ > 0. Since we know that λ = 0
implies pi (θ∗L) > α
2, it is true that:
[1− η (θ∗H)]pi (θ∗H) + [2η (θ∗H) + pi (θ∗H)− 1]pi (θ∗L)
> [1− η (θ∗H)]pi (θ∗H) + [2η (θ∗H) + pi (θ∗H)− 1]α2.
At λ = 0 the sign of λ′ is given by that of:
[1− η (θ∗H)]pi (θ∗H) + [2η (θ∗H) + pi (θ∗H)− 1]pi (θ∗L) ,
so uniqueness follows if parameters are so arranged that [1− η (θ∗H)]pi (θ∗H)+
[2η (θ∗H) + pi (θ
∗
H)− 1]α2 > 0, i.e:
2η (θ∗H) + pi (θ
∗
H)− 1
1− η (θ∗H) > −pi (θ
∗
H)
α2
,
which is equivalent to:
−pi (θ∗H)
(
1
1− η (θ∗H) + 1α2
)
<
2η (θ∗H)− 1
1− η (θ∗H) .
Since −pi (θ∗H) < −1 + (1 + α) η (θ∗H), this will be true if:
[−1 + (1 + α) η (θ∗H)]
(
1
1− η (θ∗H) + 1α2
)
<
2η (θ∗H)− 1
1− η (θ∗H) ,
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yielding:
(1 + α) η (θ∗H)
(
1
1− η (θ∗H) + 1α2
)
<
2η (θ∗H)− 1
1− η (θ∗H) + 11− η (θ∗H) + 1α2 ,
from which, after rearrangement, we obtain:
(1− α) η (θ∗H)
1− η (θ∗H) + 1α2 > (1 + α) η (θ
∗
H)
α2
. (B.3)
We now invoke the condition k ≤ α2/ (1− α2), which is consistent with
k < α, as α2/
(
1− α2) < α for α ≤ 1/2. Under this assumption, 1 −
η (θ∗H) < α
2: indeed, this is equivalent to η (θ∗H) > 1 − α2, which is true as
η (θ∗H) > 1/ (1 + k) and:
1
1 + k
− (1− α2) = −k + α2 + α2k
1 + k
> 0.
There follows that
(1−α)η(θ∗H)
1−η(θ∗H)
>
(1−α)η(θ∗H)
α2
, so that (B.3) holds if:
(1− α) η (θ∗H)
α2
+
1
α2
>
(1 + α) η (θ∗H)
α2
,
i.e.:
1 > 2η (θ∗H)α,
which is surely true for α ≤ 1/2, as 2η (θ∗H)α < 1.
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